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[L. A. No. 25644. In Bank. Jan. 27, 1961.] 
GEORGE B. PAGE, Appellant, v. H. B. PAGE, Respondent. 
[1] Partnership - Dissolution - By Express Will of Pa.rtner.-
Evidence tending merely to prove that the partners of a linen 
supply partnership expected to meet current expenses from 
current income and to recoup their investment if the business 
were successful, or a common hope that the partnership earn-
ings would pay ·for all necessary expenses;, aid not establish 
even by implication a "definite term or particular undertak-
ing," as l'equired by Corp. Code, § 15031, subd. (1) (b), pro-
viding that a partnership may be dissolved by the express will 
of any partner when no definite term or pa.rticular nndertaking 
is specified. 
[2] Id.-Dissolution-By Express Will of partner.-Partnerships 
are ordinarily entered into with the hope that they will be 
profitable, but that alone does not make them partnerships for 
a term and obligate the partners to continue until all losses 
over a period of many years have been recovered. 
[8] Id.-Dissolution-By Express Will of Partner.-Existence 
of an improved profit situation, or of bad faith of the partner 
seeking termination of a partnership, where he was the sole 
owner of a corporation holding a substantial demand note of 
the partnership, was irrelevant to the issue whether the part-
nership was for a term or at will. 
[4] Id.-Dissolution-By Express Will of Partner.-Though the 
Uniform Partnership Act provides that a partnership at will 
may be dissolved by the express will of any partner (Corp. 
Code, § 15031, subd. (1) (b», this power, like any other power 
held by a fiduciary, must be exercised in good faith. 
[6] Id.-Relations Between Pa.rtners-Fiduciary Relation.-Part-
ners are trustees for each other and in all proceediJlgs con-
nected with conduct of the partnership every partner is bound 
to act in the highest good faith to his copartners and may not 
obtain any advantage over him in the partnership affairs by 
the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threats or ad. 
verse pressure of any kind. Although Civ.Code, § 2411, em· 
bodying the foregoing language, was repealed on adoption of the 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Pa.rtnership, § 96; Am.Jur., Partnership, 
§ 242. 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Partnership, § 46; Am.Jur., Partnership, 
§ 128 et seq. 
MeK. Dig. References: [1-4, 6-8J Partnership, § 74(2); [5] Part-
nership, § 38. . 
) 
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Uniform Partnl'l'~hil' .\d, it was !lot intended by the adoption 
of thnt act to dill,jlli~h thl' fiunciary dutics hetween partners. 
[6] ld.-Dissolution-By Express Will of Partner.-A partner at 
will is not bound to relllain in a partnership, regardless of 
whether the Imsinep,s is profitable or unprofitable. A partner 
Illay not, however, by use of advcrse pressure "freeze out" a 
copartner and approprintc the business to his own use. 
[7] ld.-Dissolution-By Express Will of Partner.-A partner may 
not dissolve a partm'I';;hip to gain the benefits of the business 
for himself, unless he fully compensates his copartner for his 
share of the prospective bu~illess opportunity. In this regard 
his fiduciary duties are at least as great as those of a share-
holder of a corporn lioll. 
[8] ld.-Dissolution-By Express Will of Partner.-A partner has 
the right to dissolve the partnership by express notice to the 
other partner. If, however, it is proved that he acted in bad 
faith and violated his fiduciary duties by attempting to appro-
priate to his own use a new prosperity of the partnership with-
out adequate compensation to his copartner, the dissolution 
would be wron;;ful and he would be liable as provided by 
Corp. Code, § 15038, subd. (2) (a), relating to rights of part-
ners on wrongful dissolution, for violation of the implied 
agreement not to exclude the copartner wrongfully from the 
partnership business opportunity. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Barbara County. Ernest D. \Vaguer, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to haYe it determined whether an oral partnership 
agreement was one at will or for a t.erm. Judgment declaring 
the partnership to be one for a term, reversed. 
Cavalletto, Webster, Mullen & McCaughey, Trevey, Schwartz 
& Wood and Jack A. Otero for Appellant. 
Schauer, Ryon & Mdntyrc and Robert W. Mrlntyre for 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff and defendant are partners in a 
linen supply business ill Santa Maria, California. Plaintiff 
appeals from a judgment declaring the partnrrship to be 
for a term rather than at will. 
The partners enter<'d into an oral partnership agreement 
in 1949. 'Within the fil'>-:t t\\'o years eaeh partner <'ontributed 
approximately $43,000 for the purehase of land, machinery. 
and linen needed to begin the business. From 1949 to 1957 
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the enterprise was unprofitable, losing approximately $62,000. 
The partnership's major creditor is a corporation, wholly 
owned by plaintiff, that supplies the linen and machinery 
necessary for the day-to-day operation of the business. This 
corporation holds a $47,000 demand note of the partnership. 
The partnership operations began to improve in 1958. The 
partnership earned $3,824.41 in that year and $2,282.30 in 
the first three months of 1959. Despite this improvement 
plaintiff wishes to terminate the partnership. 
[1] The Uniform Partnership Act provides that a part-
nership may be dissolved" By the express will of any partner 
when no definite term or particular undertaking is specified." 
(Corp. Code, § 15031, subd. (1) (b).) The trial court found 
that the partnership is for a term, namely, "such reasonable 
time as is necessary to enable said partnership to repay from 
partnership profits, indebtedness incurred for the purchase 
of land, buildings, laundry and delivery equipment and linen 
for the operation of such business .... " Plaintiff correctly 
contends that this finding is without support in the evidence. 
Defendant testified that the terms of the partnership were 
to be similar to former partnerships of plaintiff and defendant, 
and that the understanding of these partnerships was that 
"we went into partnership to start the business and let the 
business operation pay for itself,-put in SO much money, 
and let the business pay itself out." There was also testimony 
that one of the former partnership agreements provided in 
writing that the profits were to be retained until all obligations 
were paid. 
Upon cross-examination defendant admitted that the former 
partnership in which the earnings were to be retained until 
the obligations were repaid was substantially different from 
the present partnership. The former partnership was a 
limited partnership and provided for a definite term of five 
years and a partnership at will thereafter. Defendant insists, 
however, that the method of operation of the former partner-
ship showed an understanding that all obligations were to be 
r~paid from profits. He nevertheless concedes that there was 
no understanding as to the term of the present partnership in 
the event of losses. He was asked: " [W] as there any discus-
sion with reference to the continuation of the business in the 
event of losses T" He replied, "Not that I can remember." 
He was then asked, "Did you have any understanding with 
Mr. Page, your brother, the plaintiff in this action, as to how 
the obligations were to be paid if there were losses f" He 
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replied, "Not that I can remember. I can't remember discuss-
ing that at all. W c neVN figured on losing, I guess." 
Viewing this evidence most favorable for defendant, it 
proves only that the partners expected to meet current ex-
penses from current income and to recoup their investment 
if the busincss were successful. 
Defendant contends that such an expectation is sufficient I 
to create a partnership for a term under the rule of Owen 
v. Cohen, 19 Ca1.2d 147, 150 [119 P.2d 713J. In that case 
we held that when a partner advances a sum of money to a 
partnership with the understanding that the amount con-
tributed was to be a loan to the partnership and was to he 
repaid as soon as feasible from the prospective profits of the 
business, the partnership is for the term reasonably required 
to repay the loan. It is truc that Owen v. Cohen, supm, and 
other cases hold that partn{'rs may impliedly agree to eontinn<' 
in business until a certain sum of money is earned (Mervyn 
Investment Co. v. Biber, 184 Cal. 637, 641-642 [194 P. 1037J), 
or one or more partners recoup their investments (VaJlgel v. 
VangC'l, 116 Ca1.App.2d 615, 625 [254 P.2d 919J), or until 
certain debts are paid (011'(;1 V. Colic/!, supm. at p. 1;)0),0;' 
until certain property could be disposed of on favorable terms 
(Shannon v. Hudson, 161 Cal.App.2d 44, 48 [325 P.2d 1022] ). 
In each of these cases, however, the implied agreement found 
support in the evidencc. 
In Owen v. Cohen, S1lpra, the partners borrowed substantial 
amounts of money to launch the enterprise and there was an 
understanding that the loans would be repaid from partner-
ship profits. In Vangel v. Vangel, supra, one partner loaned 
his copartner money to invest in the partnership with the 
understanding that the money would be repaid from partner-
ship profits. In Mervyn 1!11'csfmcnf Co. v. Biber, supra. one 
partner contributed all the capital, the other contributerl his 
services, and it was understood that upon the repayment of 
the contributed capital from partnership profits the partner 
who contributed his s<'rvires would rec<,iv(' a oIlc-third intere;t 
in the partnership assets. In each of these cascs the court 
properly held that the partners impliedly promised to continue 
the partnership for a term reasonably required to allow the 
partnership to earn sufficient money to accomplish the under-
stood objective. In Sham/1m v. lludson .. wpra, the parties 
entered into a joint venture to huild and operate a motei 
until it could be sold upon favol'ahle and mutually satisfactory 
) 
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terms, and the court held that the joint venture was for a 
reasonable term sufficient to accomplish the purpose of the 
joint venture. 
In the instant case, howe,rer, defendant failed to prove an~· 
facts from ,vhich an agreement to continue the partnership 
for a term may be implied. The understanding to ,vhich de-
fendant testified was no more than a common hope that the 
partnership earnings would pay for all the necessary ex-
pellses. Such a hope does not establish even by implication 
a "definite term or particular undertaldng". as required by 
section 15031, subdivision (1) (b), of the Corporations COdl'. 
[2] All partnerships are ordinarily entered into with the 
hope that they will be profitable, but that alone does not make 
t hem all partnerships for a term and obligate the partners to 
('ontinue in the partnE'rships until all of the losses over a period 
of many years have been recovered. 
Defendant contends that plaintiff is acting in bad faith 
and is attempting to use his superior financial position to 
appropriate the now profitable bnfliness of the partnership. 
Defendant has invested $43,000 in the firm, and owing to the 
long period of losses his interest in the partnership assets is 
very small. The fact that plaintiff's wholly owned corpora-
tion holds a $47,000 demand note of the partnershIp may make 
it difficult to sell the busiMss as a going concern. Defendant 
fears that upon dissolution he will receive very little and 
that plaintiff, who is the managing partner and knows how 
to conduct the operations of the partnership, will receive a 
business that has become very profitable because of the estab-
lishment of Vandenberg Air Force Base in its vicinity. De-
fendant charges that plaintiff has been content to share the 
losses but now that the business has become profitable hI.' 
wishes to keep all the gains. 
[3] There is no showing ill the record of bad faith or that 
the improved profit situation is more than temporary. In any 
eyent these contentions are irrelevant to the issue whether the 
partnership is for a term or at will. Since, however, this action 
is for a declaratory judgment and will be the basis for future 
action by the parties, it is appropriate to point out that defend-
ant is amply protected by the fiduciary duties of copartners. 
[4] Eyen though the Uniform Partnership Act provides 
that a partnership at will may he dissolved by the express 
will of any partner (Corp. Code, § Ui031, sllbd. (1) (b)), this 
power, like any other power held by a fiduciary, must be 
exercised in good faith. 
J 
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[5 ] We havc often statcd that'· Partners are trustees for 
each other, and in all proecedings connected with the eontIuet 
of the partnership every partner is bound to act in the highest 
good faith to his copartner and may not obtain any advantage 
over him in the partnership affairs by the slightest misrepre-
sentation, concealment, threat or adverse pressure of any 
kind." (Llewelyn v. Levi, 157 Cal. 31, 37 [106 P. 219) ; Rich-
ards v. Fraser, 122 Cal. 456, 460 [5;) P. 246]; Yeomans v. 
Lysfjord, 162 Cal.App.2d 357, 361-362 [327 P.2d 957]; c/. 
MacIsaac v. Poz:o, 26 Cal.2d 809, 81:3 [161 P.2tl 449] ; Corp. 
Code, § 15021.) Although Civil Code, section 2411, embodying 
the foregoing language, \Vas repealed upon the adoption of 
the Uniform Partnership Act, it was not intended by the 
adoption of that act to diminish the fiduciary duties between 
partners. (See MacIsaac v. Pozzo, 26 Ca1.2d 809, 813 [161 
P.2d 449] ; Yeomans v. Lysfjol'd, 162 Cal.App.2d 357, 361-362 
[327 P.2d 957].) 
[ 6 ] A partner at will is not bound to remain in a partner-
ship, regardless of whether the business is profitable or un-
profitable. A partner may not, however, by use of adverse 
pressure "freeze out" a copartner and appropriate the busi-
ness to his own use. [1] A partner may not dissolve a part-
nership to gain the benefits of the business for himself, unless 
he fully compcnsates his copartner for his share of the prospec-
tive business opportunity. In this regard his fiduciary duties 
are at least as great as those of a shareholder of a corporation. 
In the case of In re Security Finance Co., 49 Ca1.2d 370, 
376-377 [317 P.2d 1], we stated that although shareholders 
representing 50 per cent of the voting power have a right 
under Corporations Code, section 4600, to dissolve a corpora-
tion, they may not exercise such right in order" to defraud the 
other shareholders [citation], to 'freeze out' minority share-
holders [citation], or to sell the assets of the dissolved corpora-
tion at an inadequate price. [Citation.]" 
[8] Likewise in the instant case, plaintiff has the power 
to dissolve the partnership by express notice to defendant. If, 
however, it is proved that plaintiff acted in bad faith and vio-
lated his fiduciary duties by attempting to appropriate to his 
own use the new prosperity of the partnership without ade-
quate compensation to his copartner, the dissolution would be 
wrongful and the plaintiff would be liable as provided by sub-
division (2) (a) of Corporations Code, section 15038 (rights 
of partners upon wrongful dissolution) for violation of the 
) 
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implied agreement not.to excluue defendant wrongfully from 
the partnership. business opportunity. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., Dooling, J., 
and Wood (Parker), J. pro tem.,- concurred., 
